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China & the Arctic: Why the focus on international law matters 
Timo Koivurova* 
 
There has been a flurry of reaction to China’s recently released White Paper on the Arctic. It is the 
first such policy published by the country, and its focus on international law is worth further in-
depth examination.1  
China’s reliance on international law in its White Paper may seem surprising. We tend to think 
that mainly small powers rely on international law. To put it simply, small states lack the power to 
influence international relations on their own, so they like to utilize multilateral institutions and 
international law as a platform to allow them to interact in a more equal fashion in the international 
system.  
However, China is not a small power, but rather a massive country with a large population and 
huge economy. Therefore, their focus on international law in the White Paper is surprising, and 
warrants taking a more critical look.  
 
White paper structure – A review 
China’s Arctic policy starts with a description of the Arctic, the Arctic States, the region’s 
governance mechanisms, and an overview of the Arctic environment and its peoples.  
The policy then elaborates China’s position as an important stakeholder in the Arctic and the 
country’s main policy goals. These goals include deepening exploration and understanding of the 
Arctic, protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic and addressing climate change, utilizing 
Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner, participating actively in Arctic governance and 
international co-operation, and promoting peace and stability in the Arctic. 
 
Arctic governance under the spotlight 
Approaching China’s policy from the perspective of governance, it is interesting how China first 
outlines the current Arctic governance framework: 
There is no single comprehensive treaty for all Arctic affairs. The Charter of the United 
Nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Spitsbergen 
Treaty and other treaties and general international law govern Arctic affairs at present. 
(Emphasis by the author) 
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China considers this established global international law framework, as somehow governing the 
Arctic. China also justifies its legitimacy to act in the Arctic using the very same broad 
international law framework, given that it is one of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, and a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While 
UNCLOS is almost always mentioned when discussing Arctic governance, China’s strong and 
repeated reference to the UN Charter represents a clear emphasis for it as a basis of legitimacy. 
 
Policy, climate, and science in the high seas 
The UNCLOS-based rules for marine science are also emphasized in China’s White Paper, as a 
reminder that UNCLOS also guarantees marine scientific freedoms for non-coastal states, 
especially in the high seas.   
China also affirms that it is a committed party to global environmental treaties, follows the 
environmental laws and policies of the Arctic, and even encourages the adoption of more stringent 
environmental laws and policies. As a party to the Paris agreement, China quite naturally 
prioritizes tackling climate change via global measures rather than regional measures.  
In the policy section “Utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner,” China 
encourages all countries to follow relevant international treaties, UNCLOS, the Spitzbergen treaty, 
as well as relevant general international law, together with the national laws of Arctic states.  
With respect to the opening of shipping routes in the Arctic, China affirms that it respects the 
Arctic coastal states’ jurisdictions over their waters, but also emphasizes the importance of 
freedom of navigation.  
 
Support for international agreements  
China maintains that disputes over shipping routes should be settled in accordance with 
international law. Therefore, China expresses support for the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) Polar Code and encourages the IMO to play an active role in enacting future 
navigation rules for the Arctic.  
In terms of exploring and exploiting oil and gas, mineral, and other non-living resources, China 
affirms the sovereignty of Arctic states over their resources, and encourages Chinese enterprises 
to follow national law, if they engage in such activities in the region. 
Regarding fisheries, China supports concluding a legally binding agreement on the high seas 
portion of the Arctic Ocean, and, in the future, establishing a regional fisheries management 
organization. This represents a significant endorsement from a state that is not coastal to the Arctic 
Ocean. 
In the section on China’s active participation in Arctic governance and international co-operation, 




Why is China placing a heavy emphasis on international law?  
For China, the primary structures governing the Arctic include:  
• The United Nations and its Security Council (where China is a permanent member),  
• UNCLOS (to which China is a party), 
• UN specialized agencies like IMO and the treaties it produces (to which China is a party 
to most treaties),  
• The UN-based regimes combatting climate change and various other international 
environmental treaties (many of which China is a party to). 
As a state that is outside of the Arctic region, it is beneficial for China to invoke a framework of 
rules that most strongly emphasizes China’s role in Arctic governance. In the predominant 
intergovernmental forum of the Arctic, the Arctic Council, China is only an observer. This status 
is lower than that of small indigenous peoples’ international organizations, which would normally 
be considered non-governmental organizations in an intergovernmental organization  or in treaty 
negotiations. While invoking the entire framework of international law, China places itself in the 
actors’ seat. It is China, together with other permanent members of the UN Security Council, which 
has a unique responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the Arctic. It is China and the rest 
of the international community that are committed to managing the oceans via UNCLOS, mitigate 
climate change via the Paris Agreement, and combat other environmental problems through 
various international environmental treaties. 
In China’s Arctic policy, Arctic governance is mostly represented as international governance 
through international law and institutions like the UN and subsequent specialized agencies or 
relevant treaties. China does acknowledge the Arctic Council’s role as a regional institution, but 
clearly emphasizes a framework in which China can play a more significant role.   
This is not necessarily a negative approach. It is significant that China highlights the importance 
of international law, but in the White Paper, China does not treat all branches of international law 
in the same way. China does emphasize respect for indigenous peoples in many parts of the policy 
document, but does not use the appropriate language. It acknowledges their role in the region, but 
speaks of their interests and the importance of their traditions and cultures, rather than their 
internationally guaranteed rights. 
Overall, however, the Chinese Arctic policy is well crafted. The actual behavior of China in the 
region has been very much a practical application of its policy document. The country has followed 
international and national legal procedures, and has been a constructive force in the Arctic Council. 
Yet by invoking the broad general international law framework, China is constructing a framework 
in which it has a primary role.  
Within the Arctic council, China remains an observer along with countries like Switzerland or 
organizations like the Arctic Institute of North America (AINA) and the International Federation 
of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 
However, under the framework of international law, China is one of the Arctic’s main actors. 
